Is bank supervisor's independence enough? This paper provides a formal model of a bank supervisor. I find that supervisory independence should be complemented by clear mandates, legal protection and accountability arrangements for bank supervisors. I also provide empirical evidence supporting these theoretical results.
Introduction
As Masciandaro and point out, a debate about the institutional organization of banking supervision has been attracting the interest of academics and policymakers in the last years. Lastra (1996) , Goodhart (1998) and Quintyn and Taylor (2003) are among the first scholars to stress the need for independent supervisory agencies. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1997, 2006) puts the need for operational independent bank supervisors in its first Core Principle for Effective Banking Supervision. However, policymakers have been reluctant to give a substantial degree of effective independence to supervisory authorities, 1 and contradictory empirical evidence about the effects of supervisory independence on the banking sector has been presented. On the one hand, Das et al. (2004) find that the quality of supervisory governance (of which supervisory independence is a key component) matters for financial system soundness. On the other hand, Barth et al. (2004 Barth et al. ( , 2006 find that supervisory independence is not related to bank development or efficiency or the level of non-performing loans.
Is supervisory independence necessary for effective banking supervision? If yes, is it enough? More precisely, which are the characteristics that supervisory institutions should have to effectively implement a supervisory policy? In this paper I provide a formal model of a bank supervisor to answer these questions. I find that supervisory independence should be complemented by clear mandates establishing the supervisor's responsibilities and objectives, legal protection for the supervisor when he exercises his duties in good faith, and accountability arrangements (i.e., the bank supervisor should be answerable, responsible and liable to be blamed for failing to fulfill his mandates). I also provide empirical evidence supporting these theoretical findings: the existence of an independent, with clear mandates, legally protected and accountable bank supervisor reduces the average probability of failure of banks' assets from approximately 10 percent to approximately 3 percent. Moreover, while independence and clear mandates are important, the existence of appropriate accountability arrangements and, fundamentally, legal protection for bank supervisors are key elements to reduce the riskiness of the banking sector.
In the model a supervisory policy is necessary to avoid excessive risk taking by a banker and to provide her with incentives to exert effort monitoring her bank's loans. A supervisory policy characterized by a minimum capital requirement and a licensing-closure rule will work. However, the government (even if it seeks to maximize social welfare) is unable to credibly commit to this supervisory policy. As in Mailath and Mester (1994) , the government confronts a dynamic commitment problem that makes non-credible its policy. As a consequence, the banker will take excessive risks. This provides a rationale for hiring an independent bank supervisor.
To delegate supervisory authority to an independent agent is not exempt of difficulties, however. First, the independent bank supervisor may prefer to shirk rather than to work to fulfill his mandate, leading to a moral hazard problem. Second, some characteristics of supervisory information (e.g., opaqueness, complexity and confidentiality) may imply that the terms of the contract between society (e.g., a constitutional framer or legislature seeking to maximize social welfare) and the independent bank supervisor may not be properly enforced. A Parliament or a Court of Law may find it impossible to verify whether the bank supervisor has evaded his responsibilities when they access only public information about banks. However, the bank supervisor may be able to show verifiable (hard ) information. For example, audited bank's balance sheets and technical reports on the riskiness of a bank may be used to justify the supervisor's actions. Hence, the independent bank supervisor should receive a couple of mandates: to apply the socially desired supervisory policy, and to show hard information whenever it is required.
I characterize the optimal contract between society and the independent bank supervisor (i.e., the contract that gives the latter incentives to fulfill his mandates at the lowest possible cost to the former). The optimal contract can be implemented by a Law: a Bank Supervisor's Charter Law or Statute. In addition to set up the independent bank supervisor and clearly specify his objectives and responsibilities (i.e., his mandates), this Law should protect the bank supervisor for the exercise of his duties in good faith and should specify accountability arrangements. Legal protection is good for incentives. Since the bank supervisor is not liable to be blamed for fulfilling his mandates, even though this may imply high costs to the banker and the government may disagree with the supervisor's actions (because of its dynamic commitment problem), then the supervisor will have incentives to perform his duties. Legal protection is also good for participation. The lack of legal protection has to be compensated by higher revenues accruing to the supervisor. Consequently, enacting legal protection reduces the cost of having an independent bank supervisor. Accountability is good for incentives. Since the bank supervisor may be asked to justify his actions, and he may be punished when he is unable to do this or it turns out that he has failed to fulfill his mandates, then the supervisor will have incentives to perform his duties. Tough accountability arrangements specifying high frequency revisions of the supervisor's actions and high expected penalties are better for incentives. However, high frequency revisions entail higher costs (e.g., administrative costs of legislative or judicial revisions, misallocation of resources because the bank supervisor has to distract time and effort from his main function). Moreover, high expected penalties may dissuade potential supervisors from participating.
2 Consequently, policy makers should balance the good effects on incentives of tougher accountability arrangements with the higher costs they impose.
The theoretical model has the following empirical implication: the probability of failure of banks' assets (i.e., a measure of the riskiness of the banking sector) would be lower in those countries having independent, with clear objectives, legally protected and accountable bank supervisors. I use data collected by the Financial Sector Assessment Program 3 on 78 countries around the world in the period 1999-2007 to test this hypothesis. The data do not reject it. Moreover, my estimates imply that the average probability with which banks' assets fail significantly reduces from approximately 10 percent to approximately 3 percent when the supervisory arrangement has the characteristics described before.
In addition to quantifying the effect of supervisory arrangements on the riskiness of the banking sector, the empirical exercise in this paper sheds some light on the relative importance of different components of the supervisory arrangement. To set up independent bank supervisors and to give them clear responsibilities and objectives seem to be a prerequisite to control risk taking by bankers. Furthermore, the existence of adequate accountability arrangements and, fundamentally, legal protection for bank supervisors are key elements to reduce the riskiness of the banking sector. Since around 30 percent of the countries in the sample fail to enact appropriate independence and accountability arrangements and more than 50 percent of the bank su-2 In the model there is only one independent agent that could act as bank supervisor. In an extended model in which there is an heterogeneous population of potential bank supervisors, tough accountability arrangements imply that only low quality supervisors (e.g., those that are easily corruptible) will be willing to participate. This could potentially undermine the credibility of the supervisory policy. Interestingly, find strong evidence that accountability arrangements in their sample of 32 countries overcompensate supervisory independence.
3 The Financial Sector Assessment Program (http://www.imf.org/external/np/ fsap/fsap.asp) is jointly conducted by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank since 1999 with the aim, among others, of identifying the strenghts and vulnerabilities of a country's financial system by assessing its observance of relevant financial sector standards and codes.
pervisors are not legally protected, these results indicate that policy makers should be persuaded of the benefits of enacting more accurate arrangements for bank supervisors.
Differently from the literature on central banks independence, which builds up on formal models, 4 the literature on independence and, more broadly, governance of banking sector supervisors remains rhetorical. Taylor (2003, 2007) argue that the independence of supervisory agencies matters for banking stability for many of the same reasons that the independence of central banks matters for monetary stability, and that accountability arrangements should complement independence arrangements in order to make banking supervision effective. This paper provides a model (which, to my best knowledge, is the first in its gender) formalizing the optimal contract for a bank supervisor. Independence and accountability arrangements, complemented by clear mandates and legal protection for bank supervisors, emerge as a way to implement the optimal contract.
A growing body of empirical work has documented contradictory results. Das et al. (2004) construct an index of regulatory governance and find that it has a significant positive effects on their index of financial system soundness. Barth et al. (2004 Barth et al. ( , 2006 find that supervisory independence is not related to bank development or efficiency or the level of non-performing loans. The theoretical model in this paper implies a specific empirical model to test the causal effect of supervisory arrangements on the riskiness of the banking sector. Moreover, it also allows the quantification of this effect, and the uncovering of the key components of a supervisory arrangement for effective banking supervision.
The next section describes the model setup, characterizes the first-best, and proves that it cannot be achieved without banking supervision. Section 3 proves that the first-best can be implemented when a bank supervisor is able to commit to a supervisory policy, and that the government (even if it seeks to maximize social welfare) is unable to credibly commit. Section 4 characterizes the optimal contract for an independent bank supervisor and discusses on the ways in which it can be implemented. Section 5 presents the empirical exercise and Section 6 concludes. Technical proof, tables and figures are in the Appendix.
The Model

Agents, Technology and Moral Hazard
The basic model has two agents: a banker (she) and a bank supervisor (he). Both agents are risk neutral and protected by limited liability.
The banker contributes with equity capital K ∈ [0, 1] to her bank and is the residual claimant of the bank's assets. Equity capital can also be invested in an alternative project that yields a net return δ > 0. For simplicity, the size of the bank's balance sheet is normalized to 1. If the banker is authorized to operate, she collects (fully insured) retail deposits in amount D = 1 − K and invests in risky assets. Deposits are paid the risk-free interest rate, which is normalized to zero.
The banker has access to a risky investment technology (e.g., bank loans). This technology yields a random, gross return R at maturity or a deterministic, gross return R l < 1 if it is liquidated before maturity. R is contingent on the state of the world at maturity. For simplicity, I assume that there are three states of the world (upper, medium and f ailure) with corresponding returns
The distribution of probabilities on these returns depends on the banker's behavior. There is no time discounting.
In the same spirit as Biais and Casamatta (1999) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) , I consider the case where the banker takes actions in two dimensions. First, the banker decides whether to exert unobservable effort monitoring the investment. If she shirks, she will get a private benefit B and the distribution of probabilities on the returns will deteriorate in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Second, she can take excessive risks, leading to a deterioration of the distribution of probabilities on the returns in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance. Table 1 summarizes the effects of the banker's behavior on the distribution of probabilities of R.
Let π ≡ Pr (R u ) R u + Pr (R m ) R m − 1 denote the bank's assets expected net present value. For simplicity, I assume that risk-taking implies meanpreserving spreads on the distribution of probabilities of R. Thus,
To avoid non-interesting cases, I also assume that banker's effort is socially desirable: π effort > π no effort + B and π effort > δ. The bank supervisor has the authority to provide bank licenses (i.e., to authorize the banker to collect deposits and to invest) and to withdraw them (i.e., to close the bank). In addition to that, the supervisor can set minimum capital requirements, and observe the riskiness of the bank's assets at no cost. 
Effort
No Effort
Finally, a bank failure (either if the supervisor withdraws the license from the banker or if the return on the bank's assets is R f = 0) generates a social cost f . This cost comprises, for example, the break-up of valuable lenderborrower relationships, the disruption on the payment system and the costs associated to the reimbursement of insured deposits.
Benchmarks 2.2.1. The First-best Allocation
Since equity capital is more expensive than retail deposits, it is efficient to finance the bank entirely with deposits. In that case, expected social welfare is
where 1 {effort} is equal to 1 if the banker exerts effort and equal to 0 otherwise, and 1 {risk} is equal to 1 if the banker takes excessive risks and equal to 0 otherwise. If the banker exerts effort, expected social welfare will be equal to the bank's net present value under banker's effort, π effort , net of the expected social cost of a bank failure. The latter is contingent on the banker's behavior because the probability of bank failure, Pr(R f ), will increase by β if the banker takes excessive risks. If the banker does not exert effort, expected social welfare has also to consider the private benefits accruing to the banker.
Rearranging terms, expected social welfare can be written as
where cte stands for a constant that is equal to π no effort +B−(θ f +∆θ)f . Since π effort − π no effort − B + ∆θf and βf are positive, the first-best is characterized by the following Proposition. Proposition 1. (First-best) Expected social welfare is maximal if the banker exerts effort and does not take excessive risks.
No Banking Supervision
In this section, I consider a situation in which the banker is authorized to operate but there is no authority with the power to close the bank or to request a minimum level of equity capital.
Let B denote the banker's expected benefits. For example, if the banker exerts effort and does not take excessive risks, her expected benefits will be
The first two terms are the expected residual values of the bank's assets (i.e., the return on assets net of the reimbursement to depositors) when bank assets' returns are R u and R m respectively. Limited liability implies that the banker gets zero if the bank fails (i.e., if R = R f ). The last term is the opportunity cost of equity capital. Rearranging terms and using the definition of the bank's net present value under banker's effort (i.e., π
There are two reasons that make the banker prefers to finance her bank's investment exclusively with retail deposits. First, retail deposits are cheaper than equity capital; the banker can save δK by financing with deposits. Second, the banker will not lose her contribution of capital to the bank if the bank's investment fails (which occurs with probability θ f in the case of effort and no risk-taking). Table 2 summarizes the effects of the banker's behavior on her expected benefits.
The banker will always prefer to take excessive risks. If the banker takes risks, then the probability of the upper and the failure states will increase. So, the banker will benefit more frequently from high returns but her bank will also fail with a higher probability. However, limited liability implies that the banker internalizes only a fraction (her contribution of capital K to the bank) of the losses that are generated by the failure of the bank. Otherwise stated, limited liability provides the banker with incentives to gamble with depositors' money. Thus, the first-best allocation of risk and effort cannot be implemented without banking supervision. 
Behavior
Banker's Expected Benefits
Proposition 2. The socially optimal (first-best) allocation of effort and risk cannot be implemented without banking supervision. Without banking supervision, the banker will always prefer to take excessive risks and will only exert effort monitoring the bank's investment if the effort problem is not dominant (i.e., if
).
Proof.
• B
. Thus, the banker will always (i.e., regardless of her contribution of capital to the bank, K) prefer to take excessive risks.
•
Since the banker will finance her bank exclusively with retail deposits and π effort − π no effort = ∆θR u , it follows that:
(the banker will shirk).
Banking Supervision
Banking supervision is necessary to curb the banker's incentives to take excessive risks and to evade the monitoring of her bank's assets.
The timing of the model with banking supervision is as follows. First, the bank supervisor announces the supervisory policy (i.e., a minimum capital requirement K and a licensing-closure policy). Second (licensing stage), the banker contributes with equity capital K to her bank and solicits a license to operate the bank. The supervisory authority decides whether to provide the license to the banker. Third, conditional on obtaining a license the banker raises retail deposits in amount D = 1 − K, makes her risk-taking decision, invests, and makes her effort decision. Forth (supervisory stage), the bank supervisor observes the riskiness of the bank's assets and decides whether to revoke the license to the banker (i.e., to close the bank). Fifth, conditional on continuation (i.e., if the bank retains its license) bank's assets yield their returns.
Banking Supervision under Commitment
In this section, I consider a situation in which the bank supervisor is able to commit to a supervisory policy.
If the effort problem is not dominant (i.e., if
), the banker will always exert effort. Since equity capital is more expensive than retail deposits, it is efficient to require a minimum level of capital K equal to zero to provide the banker with a license. In the more interesting case in which the effort problem is dominant, the minimum capital requirement will play a crucial role to align the incentives of the banker to exert effort. Since the incremental benefit from exerting effort
e the banker will exert effort, and if K < K e the banker will shirk. 5 Thus, the bank supervisor should provide the license to the banker only if her contribution of capital to the bank is larger than the minimum capital requirement K = K e . Minimum capital requirements are not enough to prevent the banker's risk-taking behavior because the banker's expected benefit is always higher if she takes excessive risks (B
Thus, a closing rule may be necessary to curb the banker's incentives to take excessive risks.
7 Indeed, if the bank supervisor commits to revoke the license to those
If the effort problem is dominant, then K e > 0. 6 For a detailed study of the consequences of capital regulations on the portfolio choices of commercial banks see Rochet (1992) . He concludes that "capital regulations (at least of the usual type) are a very poor instrument for controlling the risk of banks: they give incentives for choosing 'extreme' asset allocations, and are relatively inefficient for reducing the risk of bank failures." (page 1160) except under specific conditions (utility maximizing banks and 'market-based' risk weights in the regulatory solvency ratio).
7 Any policy that reduces the banker's expected benefit by at least β(1 − K) may work. Since the objective of this paper is not to analyze which policy is optimal but to study bankers that have engaged in risky investments, then bankers will refrain from taking excessive risks. If the banker does not take excessive risks, she will get
If, however, the banker takes risks, then her license will be revoked, she will get a return equal to zero and she will lose her contribution of capital to the bank. Thus, the banker will get
Moreover, the banker will establish the bank because B effort & no risk ≥ 0.
8
Let characterize a supervisory policy as follows.
Definition 1. (Supervisory policy)
The supervisory policy is characterized as follows: -to set a minimum capital requirement
, and
; -to provide licenses to operate banks to those bankers that contribute with equity capital K ≥ K; and -to revoke the license to those bankers that have engaged in risky investments.
Thus, the previous results prove the following Proposition.
Proposition 3. Assume the supervisory authority is able to commit to the supervisory policy characterized in Definition 1. Then, the banker will exert effort and will not take excessive risks (i.e., the first-best allocation of effort and risk will be implemented).
Dynamic Commitment Problem
In this section, I assume that the objective of the supervisory authority is to maximize social welfare. For example, one can think of the supervisory authority as being the executive or legislative branches of the government (e.g., the Ministry of Finance).
In this setting, the supervisory authority is unable to credibly commit to revoke the license to those bankers that have taken excessive risks. The government confronts a dynamic commitment problem that makes non-credible which institutional arrangements are necessary to implement a supervisory policy, I focus, for simplicity, on a (possibly non-optimal) closure policy.
8 A sufficient condition for the participation of the banker is that K ≤
the supervisory policy characterized in Definition 1. 9 Thus, the banker will exert effort monitoring her banks' assets (because of the minimum capital requirements) and will engage in risky investments. Otherwise stated, the first-best allocation of effort and risk cannot be implemented by the government acting as bank supervisor.
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Proposition 4. The first-best allocation of effort and risk cannot be implemented by the government (welfare maximizer) acting as bank supervisor. The banker will always take excessive risks.
Proof. Assume that the banker has obtained a license by contributing with equity capital K ≥ K and has taken excessive risks. At the supervisory stage, the supervisory authority (the central government) should revoke the license to the banker. Let r stands for the supervisor's decision: r = 1 means revocation and r = 0 means continuation. The government's problem is
If the license is revoked, the bank's liquidation value is R l , deposits (D = 1 − K) are reimbursed and equity capital K is lost, and society suffers from the cost of the bank failure f . If the bank continues, society will benefits from the expected net present value of the bank (under banker's effort since K ≥ K) net of the expected cost of a bank failure. Rearranging terms, the government's problem is
where cte stands for a constant that is equal to π effort − (θ f + β)f . The term is brackets is negative because R l < 1, π effort > 0 (because π effort > δ > 0), and 1 − θ f − β > 0. Thus, this problem has r * = 0 as solution. The banker anticipates the government's behavior and will take excessive risks.
Is Bank Supervisor's Independence Enough?
Proposition 4 shows that the government, even if it seeks to maximize social welfare, is unable to implement the first-best allocation (i.e., banker's effort and no risk-taking) because it is unable to credibly commit to the supervisory policy. In this section, I analyze the design of contracts between society (i.e., a welfare maximizer in the form of a constitutional framer or legislature) and an agent (i.e., an independent bank supervisor) to make the supervisory policy credible.
The Structure of Contracts
Society makes a contract with an independent (from the government) bank supervisor before the banker solicits a license, commits to it, and is not allowed to renegotiate it later on. This is a reasonable assumption if we think of the contract as a Statute or Charter Law for the bank supervisor.
The contract has four elements: {M, w, q, p}. M ≡ {m, m i } is a set of mandates. The mandate m is to apply the supervisory policy characterized in Definition 1. The mandate m i specifies an informational requirement: it commands the independent supervisor to keep informed about the bank's condition and to be able to show hard, verifiable, information whenever it is required. (The rationale for m i will become clear below in this section.) w is the monetary revenue of the bank supervisor. The contract also specifies random monitoring. With probability q ∈ [0, 1] the independent bank supervisor is monitored (i.e., he is asked questions and demanded to show hard information in support of his responses). The monitoring technology has a cost g. It comprises, for example, the administrative costs of a legislative or judicial review of the supervisor's actions. If monitored, the supervisor is punished (e.g., he is fired and forbidden to work in the banking sector) with probability p ∈ [0, 1]. The supervisor is never punished without monitoring. If punishment occurs, the supervisor will suffer from a non-pecuniary (e.g., reputational) cost c.
The bank supervisor decides whether to exert unobservable effort to fulfill M . If he shirks in m, he will obtain a private benefit b and m will not be fulfilled (≡m). For example, if the supervisor does not close a risky bank, he would obtain favors (e.g., presents or job offers) from the banker. If he shirks in m i , he will obtain a private benefit b i and m i will not be fulfilled (≡m i ).
Even though it is assumed that the bank supervisor observes the riskiness of the bank's assets at no cost, this information remains soft in the sense that it cannot be verified by third parties. Thus, the contract would not be enforced properly; it would be impossible for the Parliament or a Court of Law to verify, for example, whether a bank remains open because its banker has not taken excessive risks or because the bank supervisor has evaded his responsibilities. However, it is assumed that the bank supervisor might transform the supervisory information into hard, verifiable, information with some probability µ ∈ (0, 1) if he exerts some effort. For example, he might conduct on-site inspections with the aim of certifying the bank's assets quality, and he might process financial information with the aim of proving that the bank has indeed a risky position. If the bank supervisor does not exert effort to certify the supervisory information, it will remain soft information and the supervisor will get the private benefit b i . Thus, the mandate m i has its rationale in this informational problem; it is an instrument to properly enforce the contract.
The Optimal Contract
The optimal contract provides the independent bank supervisor with the incentives to fulfill the set of mandates M at the lowest expected cost for society. The following Proposition characterizes the optimal contract.
Proposition 5. The optimal contract between society and an independent bank supervisor {M, w * , q * , p * } is characterized as follows: -a set M ≡ {m, m i } of mandates, where m is to apply the supervisory policy characterized in Definition 1 and m i is to keep informed about the bank's condition and to be able to show hard information whenever it is required; -a monetary revenue for the bank supervisor w
and -a probability of being asked questions (monitored) q * and a probability of being punished p * such that p
and p * (m i ) are the optimal probabilities of being punished when both mandates are fulfilled, when m i is fulfilled but m is not, and when m i is not fulfilled respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A.
An independent bank supervisor acting under this optimal contract will execute the supervisory policy characterized in Definition 1. Thus, the firstbest allocation of effort and risk will be obtained (see Proposition 3).
Implementation
In this section, I discuss on the ways in which the optimal contract characterized in Proposition 5 can be implemented.
Let think of the contract as a Statute or Charter Law for an independent (from the government) bank supervisor. To enact the contract into a law has the following advantages. First, since a law can only be replaced by another law, and laws generally require long, costly and complex processes to be passed, then the legislature (who offers the contract; who votes the Charter Law) has limited ability to renegotiate the contract once it is enacted. Second, the legislature can limit the possibilities for governmental intervention in the supervisory process. Third, since the natural way to enforce laws is through the judicial branch of the government, the legislature strengthens the enforcement of the contract. Otherwise stated, the execution of the terms of the supervisor's Charter Law will be not only subject to the surveillance of the legislative branch of the government (and possibly to the executive one too), but also to judicial review.
The independent bank supervisor should have the authority and legal powers to apply the supervisory policy characterized in Definition 1. In particular, the Law should allow the independent bank supervisor to exercise his judgments in matters as licensing, supervision (e.g., on-site inspections), and application of sanctions (e.g., to revoke licenses). Without these powers, the bank supervisor should rely on the government to, for example, revoke a banker's license. As we know from Proposition 4, this will make non-credible the supervisory policy.
The optimal monetary revenue for the bank supervisor is w * = 1−µ µ (b i +b). Thus, the bank supervisor's Charter Law should give an adequate budget to the supervisory authority. This budget should compensate the supervisor for the effort exerted to fulfill his mandates (i.e., b i + b). Moreover, the budget should increase in the level of difficulty to achieve the supervisory tasks (w * is increasing in 1 − µ, the probability of failing to fulfill m i even if effort is exerted). Continuous change, new developments, new products, new risks and increasing opaqueness are characteristics of the banking industry. These characteristics imply new challenges for the bank supervisor, who may find it optimal to reallocate resources to better supervise in this changing environment. He should be allowed to do that.
The Charter Law should specify clear objectives and responsibilities (i.e., mandates) to the bank supervisor. If the objectives and responsibilities of the supervisory authority are not clearly established, then it will be impossible to determine whether the supervisor has behaved or not. So, to specify clear mandates in the Law is a necessary condition to enforce it.
The optimal contract characterized in Proposition 5 implies that the probability with which the independent bank supervisor should be punished when he has fulfilled both mandates, p * (m i , m), is equal to zero. Thus, the Charter Law should protect the supervisor from being held liable for damages caused by his actions when he has taken them in good faith (i.e., in accordance with his mandates).
Finally, Proposition 5 implies that q * > 0, p * (m i ) > 0 and p * (m i ,m) ≥ 0. That is, the independent bank supervisor should be demanded to explain the condition of the banking industry and to give satisfactory reasons for his actions with a positive probability. Moreover, the supervisor has to be prepared for that, and he is liable to be blamed for the exercise of his duties in bad faith; he should be punished with a positive probability if he does not fulfill his obligations. Answerability and responsibility together imply that the independent bank supervisor should be accountable.
12 Since the legislative branch of the government offers the contract on behalf of the society, the bank supervisor should be accountable to it. However, the Charter Law may establish accountability arrangements in which the supervisor is also accountable to the other branches of the government and the banking industry.
13
12 According to the Collins English Dictionary, "If you are accountable to someone for something that you do, you are responsible for it and must be prepared to justify your actions to that person."
13 Hüpkes et al. (2005; give operational content to the concept of accountability. They also discuss specific arrangements that can best secure the objectives of bank
The following Proposition summarizes the previous discussion.
Proposition 6. The optimal contract characterized in Proposition 5 can be implemented by a Law, a Bank Supervisor's Charter Law or Statute, that: -(Independence: Institutional and Supervisory) sets up an independent (from the government) bank supervisor and gives him the authority and powers to apply the supervisory policy; -(Independence: Budgetary) gives an adequate budget to the bank supervisor and allows him to determine the allocation of resources; -(Objectives) specifies clear objectives and responsibilities (mandates) to be fulfilled by the bank supervisor; -(Legal Protection) provides legal protection to the bank supervisor for the exercise of his duties in good faith; and -(Accountability) makes the bank supervisor accountable; i.e., answerable, responsible and liable to be blamed for failing to fulfill his mandates.
Empirical Evidence
In this section, I make an empirical analysis and provide empirical evidence supporting the implications of the theoretical model.
Empirical Strategy
Propositions 3, 4 and 5 imply that the probability of failure of banks' loans, Pr(R f ), would be lower if the supervisory arrangement has the characteristics that are detailed in Proposition 6. If the supervisory arrangement has not these characteristics, a dynamic commitment problem will undermine the credibility of the supervisory policy and will impulse the banker to take excessive risks (Proposition 4). Thus, Pr(R f ) = θ f + β. The existence of an independent, with clear objectives, legally protected and accountable bank supervisor will ensure the credibility of the supervisory policy (Propositions 5 and 6). Thus, the banker will not take excessive risks and Pr(R f ) = θ f (Proposition 3). That is,
supervisors' accountability: regular (and ad hoc) reports to the legislative and the executive branches of the government, as well as to the public in general, judicial review, and supervisor's liability for faulty supervision.
where 1 {CP1} is equal to 1 if the supervisory arrangement has the characteristics detailed in Proposition 6 and equal to 0 otherwise. To test this implication I use the following cross-country linear regression:
where N P L i (the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans in the banking system of country i) is an estimation of the probability of failure of banks' loans in country i (i.e., Pr(R f i ) ≡ N P L i − i ; i is the estimation error), CP 1 i is the observed compliance of country i with the supervisory arrangement that is characterized in Proposition 6, and a 1 and a 2 are parameters to be estimated. Under the assumptions that is uncorrelated with CP 1 and that the variance of CP 1 is different from zero, the parameters in Equation (1) are identified: θ f = a 1 + a 2 , and β = −a 2 .
Since θ f and β are probabilities, then a 2 < 0 and a 1 + a 2 > 0.
Data Set
The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) conducted since 1999 by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank is the main source of the data I use. Every time that a FSAP is conducted for an individual country, a Report on its Observation of Standards and Codes (ROSC) is published. In particular, ROSCs summarize the extent to which countries observe the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (Core Principles thereafter), a framework of minimum standards for sound supervisory practices that are considered universally applicable (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006) . Following the methodology proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999), the assessment of compliance with each component part of the Core Principles is done using a four point grading scale. The four grades reported on the ROSCs are: (0) non-compliant, implying no substantive implementation of the Principle; (1) materially non-compliant, if there are severe shortcomings, despite the existence of formal rules, regulations and procedures, and there is evidence that supervision has clearly not been effective; (2) largely compliant, whenever only minor shortcomings are observed which do not raise any concerns about the authority's ability and clear intent to achieve full compliance; and (3) compliant, when all essential criteria are met without any significant deficiencies. Table C .2 in Appendix C shows the FSAP's data for four component parts of Core Principle 1: (objectives) "An effective system of banking supervision will have clear responsibilities and objectives for each authority involved in the supervision of banks"; (independence) "Each such authority should possess operational independence, transparent processes, sound governance and adequate resources (...)"; (legal protection) "A suitable legal framework for banking supervision is also necessary, including legal protection for supervisors"; and (accountability) "Each such authority should (...) be accountable for the overall exercise of its duties." These data allow the construction of a variable (named CP 1) which accounts for the overall compliance of individual countries with the Core Principle 1. Otherwise stated, CP 1 indicates whether a country effectively possesses a supervisory arrangement as the one that is characterized in Proposition 6.
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The data set contains information for all countries for which the FSAP had reported at least one ROSC as for January 2008 (i.e., in the period 1999-2007): 78 countries in total. Many countries present missing values for some of the component parts of CP 1 (see Table C .2 for details). For the analysis in the next two Sections I assume that values are missing at random; thus, I consider countries with complete information only. The robustness of the results that are obtained under this assumption is checked in Section 5.5. The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (N P L), as well as other variables that are described in Table C .1 in Appendix C, are averages over the period 1999-2007. Figure B .1 in Appendix B shows histograms of each component part of CP 1. Most of the countries establish clear responsibilities and objectives for their bank supervisors. However, the average level of compliance with the other component parts of CP 1 is substantially lower. Around 30 percent of 14 There may be many ways of constructing CP 1. I use the following: (1) the grades assigned to each component part of Core Principle 1 (i.e., objectives, independence, legal protection and accountability) are recoded as follows: 0 and 1 to 0, and 2 and 3 to 1; (2) an auxiliary variable is constructed: CP 1 aux =
Descriptive Analysis
Objectives+Indepenence+Legal Protection+Accountability 4
; (3) if CP 1 aux ≤ median of CP 1 aux, then CP 1 = 0, otherwise CP 1 = 1. Table C .1 in Appendix C shows alternative definitions for CP 1, and Section 5.5 shows that the results are robust to changes in the definition of CP 1.
the countries in the sample fail to give adequate levels of independence and accountability to their supervisory authorities, and more than 50 percent of the supervisors are not legally protected.
The cross-correlation Table C .3 in Appendix C shows a negative relationship between CP 1 and N P L (the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans). It also shows positive correlations between CP 1 and two variables accounting for the development and the soundness of the banking system: the bank development indicator (BD, a measure of the importance of the banking system in the economy) and the financial soundness indicator (F SI, a measure of the health status of the banking sector) respectively.
These correlations also appear in Table C .4, which shows the integration of three clusters of countries (as suggested by the histogram of CP 1 that is plotted in Figure B .2) and by-group descriptive statistics for three selected variables: N P L, BD and F SI. The by-group mean value of N P L decreases and the by-group mean values of BD and F SI increase as the by-group mean value of CP 1 increases. Table 3 , column (1), shows the regression coefficients for a 1 and a 2 in Equation (1) estimated by using ordinary least squares (OLS).
Regression Results
15 Both coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level and have the expected sign: a 1 > 0 and a 2 < 0. Moreover, the null hypothesis Ho: a 1 + a 2 = 0 is rejected at the 1 percent level (the Wald statistic is 26.11) implying that the alternative hypothesis H 1 : a 1 + a 2 > 0 is not rejected. Thus, the estimates of the parameters of interest do not violate the theoretical restrictions imposed by the model.
The punctual estimation for β is β = 7.087, and the punctual estimation for θ f is θ f = 3.259. This means that the existence of an independent, with clear objectives, legally protected and accountable bank supervisor reduces the average probability of failure of banks' assets from approximately 10 percent to approximately 3 percent. This is the main result of this empirical exercise.
Columns (2) to (5) in Table 3 attempt to analyze the individual contribution of each component part of CP 1 to the previous result. The coefficient of objectives is not significant, the coefficient of independence is significant at the 10 percent level, and the coefficients of legal protection and accountability are significant at the 1 percent level. All estimated coefficients have the expected sign, i.e. compliance with the component parts of CP 1 individually reduces the average probability of banks' assets failure. The coefficients of legal protection and accountability are higher (in absolute value) than those of objectives and independence, and their explanatory power is also higher (the adjusted R 2 s are higher). Consequently, legal protection and accountability seems to be the most important component parts of CP 1 (columns (4) and (5)).
Columns (6) and (7) in Table 3 confirm this presumption. All coefficients have the expected sign and, conditional on the average compliance with objectives and independence, legal protection is significant at the 1 percent level (column (6)) and accountability is significant at the 5 percent level (column (7)).
Finally, column (8) in Table 3 shows that to provide legal protection to the supervisory authorities is what makes effective the supervisory policy. All coefficients have the expected sign but (conditional on the level of compliance with objectives, independence and accountability) only the coefficient for legal protection is significant. Consequently, legal protection for bank supervisors is a key element of the bank supervisory arrangement.
To summarize, the empirical implications of this paper are not rejected by FSAP's data. The existence of an independent, with clear objectives, legally protected and accountable bank supervisor significatively reduces the average probability with which banks' loans fail. Moreover, while all component parts of the Core Principle 1 are important to the previous result, the existence of accountability arrangements and (fundamentally) legal protection for bank supervisors are key elements to reduce the riskiness of the banking sector.
Robustness Checks
The empirical results presented in the previous section are robust to a series of checks. In this section I make brief comments about these robustness checks.
Different construction of CP 1. Column (1) in Table C .5 presents the regression results of estimating Equation (1) using CP 1 1 instead of CP 1 as explanatory variable. CP 1 1 differs from CP 1 in that the former does not recode the original FSAP's assessments while the latter does (see Table C .1 for details). The different construction of this explanatory variable implies only slight differences in the estimated coefficients of Equation (1) but it does not change the qualitative results.
Statutory information. Columns (2) to (9) in Table C .5 reproduce the regressions in Table 3 using an enlarged data set. The concern that I analyze is whether the reduced size of the main data set (the FSAP's data) is affecting the results. I enlarge the main data set by replacing its missing values by an assessment of the compliance with Core Principle 1 that is based on the revision of statutory information for bank supervisors. That is, I read the Charter Laws of bank supervisors and assign a grade to each particular country in each particular component part of Core Principle 1 (that were missing in the main data set) according to the methodology published by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999). Bold figures in Table C.2 show the information coming from this source. A possible caveat with these data is that it reflects declared compliance (e.g., the legislator's desired level of supervisory independence and accountability) but it does not account for the existence of shortcomings that prevent its implementation. The results that are shown in columns (2) to (9) in Table C .5 differ only slightly from those that are shown in Table 3 . Thus, the size of the main data set is not affecting the results.
Control variables. Recent theoretical and empirical work suggests a number of factors that may affect the riskiness of the banking sector. Table C.6 in Appendix C presents the regression results for the following equation
where X is a matrix of exogenous determinants of the riskiness of banks and γ is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The coefficients for a 1 and a 2 estimated using this equation differ only slightly from those estimated using Equation (1). Moreover, the introduction of exogenous control variables does not reduce the explanatory power of CP 1. Thus, the results in the last section does not depend on including the matrix of control variables X. Das et al. (2004) suggest that macroeconomic factors as the government's fiscal position, the rate of inflation and the short-term real interest rate may have effects on the quality of bank assets. Column (1) in Table C .6 shows the regression results when X contains the short-term real interest rate. Its coefficient has a positive sign, suggesting that higher real interest rates make it harder for borrowers to honor their loans, but it is not significant. Similar results are obtained when controlling for the government's fiscal deficit as a percentage of the gross domestic product, the rate of inflation, the rate of growth of the gross domestic product and the gross domestic product per capita.
Column (2) in Table C .6 shows the regression results when controlling for an indicator of the institutional and governance environment. Kaufmann et al. (2006) construct a Regulatory Quality (RQ) indicator as a measure of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations. The higher the global quality of regulation in a country, the lower the level of non-performing loans in its banking sector; the coefficient of RQ is negative and significant at the 6 percent level. However, controlling for the RQ indicator does not reduce the explanatory power of CP 1. Similar results are obtained if the RQ indicator is replaced by an indicator of the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, and by an indicator of the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts (Kaufmann et al.' 
s Government Effectiveness and Rule of Law indicators respectively).
Column (3) in Table C .6 shows the regression results when controlling for an indicator of the structure of the banking system: the percentage of the banking system's assets that is held by state-owned banks (SOB). Barth et al. (2006) suggest that it is important to control for the degree of stateowned banks because government ownership may distort the application of different supervisory approaches. The SOB's coefficient is not significant. Moreover, controlling for SOB (as well as for the degree of foreign-owned banks and for a measure of the concentration in the banking industry) does not change the results with respect to CP 1.
Finally, La Porta et al. (1998; argue that historically determined differences in countries' legal systems help explain international differences in financial markets today. They find that countries whose legislation is inspired by the French Commercial Code and the Socialist Law are more willing to exhibit inferior government performance (La Porta et al. 1999 ) and inferior creditors' protection (La Porta et al. 1998 ) than those countries whose legislation is inspired by the English Common Law. Thus, the former group of countries should show higher levels of non-performing loans than the latter group. Column (4) in Table C .6 confirms this hypothesis. However, the introduction of dummy variables to account for the legal origin of countries does not affect the results with respect to CP 1.
Instrumental variables. CP 1 and might be correlated because of a measurement error problem and an endogeneity problem. First, since the estimation of the probability with which country's i bank loans fail (i.e., N P L i ) is done by country's i supervisory authority, then country's i compliance with Core Principle 1 might affect the estimation of Pr(R f i ), leading to a measurement error problem. Second, although one can think that supervisory institutions cannot be easily changed as a result of the current or past level of non-performing loans (because it is costly and complex to change institutions), one cannot rule out a series of "third factors" explaining both the supervisory arrangements and the level of non-performing loans. This leads to an endogeneity problem. I run instrumental variable regressions to check the robustness of the previous section results to these problems.
To select instrumental variables for CP 1 I use recent theoretical and empirical work. First, some argue that geography influences economic institutions (see Barth et al. 2004, p. 241, and 2006, p. 193 , and the references therein). According to these work, countries with rich natural endowments are particularly conducive to the development of complex economic institutions. However, countries with poor climates (in particular the tropics) may be less likely to develop a wide array of institutions, including bank supervisory institutions. Thus, I use latitudinal distance from the equator as an instrument. Second, La Porta et al. (1998 and argue that differences in the legal origin of countries may influence the strength of governments and its relationship with economic and financial institutions. Thus, I also use dummy variables accounting for the country's legal origin as instruments. Importantly, the first stage regressions always reject the null hypothesis that these variables do not explain the cross-country variation in CP 1. Table C .7 in Appendix C shows the results of the instrumental variables regressions using a two-stage least squares estimator. The estimated coefficients for a 1 and a 2 are significant at the 1 percent level and have the expected sign. Thus, the results obtained in the previous section are robust to potential measurement errors in the data. Moreover, they are robust to both the measurement error problem and the consideration of exogenous factors (control variables) affecting the amount of non-performing loans simultaneously (columns (2) to (4)).
The second part of Table C .7 shows that the instruments pass a series of tests (the Sargan-Hansen test of over identifying restrictions, and two versions of the Kleibergen and Paap's (2006) rank statistic to test for under and weak identification), confirming that the instruments are strongly correlated with the potentially endogenous regressors.
Concluding Remarks
This paper formalize the optimal contract for a bank supervisor. The results imply that supervisory independence is necessary to ensure the credibility of a supervisory policy. Moreover, independence arrangements should be complemented by accountability arrangements (i.e., the bank supervisor should be answerable, responsible and liable to be blamed for failing to fulfill his mandates), clear mandates establishing the supervisor's responsibilities and objectives, and legal protection for the bank supervisor when he exercises his duties in good faith.
The theoretical model implies testable implications about the causal effect of supervisory arrangements on the riskiness of the banking sector. A empirical exercise allows the quantification of this effect: the existence of an independent, with clear objectives and responsibilities, legally protected and accountable bank supervisors significantly reduces the average probability of failure of banks' assets from approximately 10 percent to approximately 3 percent.
The empirical exercise in this paper also allows the uncovering of the key components of a supervisory arrangement for effective banking supervision: legal protection and accountability. Since around 30 percent of the countries in the sample fail to enact appropriate independence and accountability arrangements and more than 50 percent of the bank supervisors are not legally protected, the results indicate that policy makers should be persuaded of the benefits of enacting more accurate arrangements for bank supervisors.
A. Appendix: Proof of Proposition 5
Let p(m i , m), p(m i ,m) and p(m i ) stand for the probability of being punished when both mandates are fulfilled, when m i is fulfilled but m is not, and when m i is not fulfilled respectively. If m i is not fulfilled, it will not matter whether m is fulfilled or not because it will be impossible to verify the riskiness of the bank's assets by third parties.
The bank supervisor's participation constraint is
Rearranging terms it is equivalent to
There are three incentive compatibility conditions. First, the bank supervisor should find it optimal to fulfill the m i mandate:
This is equivalent to
Second, the bank supervisor should find it optimal to fulfill the m mandate:
Third, the bank supervisor should find it optimal to fulfill m i and m simultaneously:
(ICm i &m) implies (ICm i ). Thus, the latter is redundant. To reduce p(m i , m) relaxes (P C), (ICm) and (ICm i &m). Thus, it is optimal to set p
, and (2) (P C), (ICm) and (ICm i &m) can be rewritten as
To reduce p(m i ) relaxes (P C ) and (ICm ). Thus, (ICm i &m ) should bind:
Replacing the expression for p(m i ) given by (ICm i &m ) into (P C ) and (ICm ), they become
Since it is optimal to minimize the expected social cost of providing incentives to the bank supervisor (w + qg), then (P C ) and (ICm ) should bind:
Since q is a probability, then (ICm ) implies that
Replacing the optimal values of w and q given by (w * ) and (q * ) respectively into (ICm i &m ), and taking into account that p(m i ) is a probability, we have that C. Appendix: Tables Principle 1(2) Note: Objectives, Independence, Legal Protection and Accountability are coded: 0= Non-compliant, 1=Materially non-compliant, 2=Largely compliant, 3=Compliant. 0 and 1 recoded to 0, and 2 and 3 recoded to 1 for regression purposes.
CP1
Compliance with Core Principle 1 Author's calculation Definition: (1) Obj., Ind., Legal Pro. and Acc. are recoded: 0 and 1 to 0, and 2 and 3 to 1; (2) CP1 aux=(Obj.+Ind.+Legal Pro.+Acc.)/4; (3) If CP1 aux ≤ median of CP1 aux, then CP1=0; (4) 
